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Director, Air Transport Division, Defense Air Transportation
Administration, Department of Commerce. Formerly economist with
the Civil Aeronautics Board. B.S. in M.E. (aero.), 1933; M.A., 1943;
Ph.D., 1953.*
INTRODUCTION
OMPETITION among domestic trunk airlines cost at least $84,-
000,000 in 1953. The purpose of this paper is to answer these
questions:
How is this cost estimated?
What advantages are claimed for airline competition to justify
these costs?
What is airline competition, and how does it differ from competi-
tion among free enterprises?
Since the costs greatly outweigh the claimed advantages, what can
be done to reduce airline competition?
"Competition" and "monopoly" are words highly charged with
emotion. The outlook of each person on these words is an integral part
of his personal orientation toward politics, economics, and society in
general. The American people are almost unanimous in feeling strongly
pro-competition and anti-monopoly. They believe that competition
is basic to the "American way," the normal for economic relationships
just as freedom is the ideal for political relationships, the best way to
balance supply and demand without outside interference. They believe
that the competitive urge is the most powerful drive in business, pro-
vides the vigor which has made the United States the world leader in
economic power, and is the mechanism of American progress.
By contrast, monopoly is thought of as evil in itself. It is economic
dictatorship, fattening on consumers, and crushing the life from inde-
pendent enterprisers who are the backbone of the American economy.
*This paper is an abridgment of the author's Ph.D. dissertation. The views
expressed are entirely his own, and not those of the government agencies of his
present or past employment.
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Any so-called economies of monopoly are delusory, far outweighed in
the long run by the destruction of competitive initiative.
These conclusions are quite correct, on the average. But it should
be remembered that averages, although reasonably accurate for a
majority of cases, may be definitely inaccurate for the minority. Few
people stop to think that the traditional ideas of free enterprise are
true only of part of the American economy, and in varying degrees.
Few realize how completely the public utility industries are removed
from the workings of the free enterprise system. Unlike others, these
industries cannot independently set their own prices and determine
their own services, maintain control over their profits, or have free-
dom to enter into business. They are thoroughly regulated by public
agencies. These industries were once part of free enterprise, but they
have been excluded from it. Competition did not make them work
properly; monopoly was feared; public regulation was therefore chosen
for them.
Air transportation is not part of the free enterprise system. Here,
competition does not work any inexorable process of survival of the
fittest, with the weakest being driven to the wall, the most efficient
remaining, and the government keeping its hands off. Here, a monopoly
does not have its usual power to restrict production, raise prices, and
hold its customers powerless. Of all industries, public utilities are the
least free to operate under any theoretical iron laws of economic
mechanics. Of all public utilities, air transportation is probably the
most minutely regulated by the government, and is normally subsidized
by the government as well.
Criticisms of Airline Competition
In 1938 the airlines pleaded for government regulation. It was not
the public who demanded it, as had been true of the move for regula-
tion of railroads. It is sometimes difficult, when listening to the views
of many airline people today, to realize that it was the airlines them-
selves who asked the government to step in and regulate them. The
spokesman of the industry said in 1938, in urging the passage of the
Act:
it is necessary for this bill to pass at this session of the Con-
gress if you are going to retain this air industry .... Without your
immediate help, this industry as we now know it cannot exist. 1
The airlines were in desperate shape. In the dozen years of their exist-
ence, half of the $125,000,000 invested in them had been lost.2
Excessive competition was the major reason given for the industry's
troubles. The board of the Air Transport Association said that air
1 Testimony of Edgar S. Gorrell, President, Air Transport Association of
America. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
To Create a Civil Aeronautics Authority (Hearings, 75th Congress, 3rd Session.
Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 298.
2 Testimony of Edgar S. Gorrell. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, Aviation (Hearings, 75th Congress, 1st Session.
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 62.
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transportation, like the early railroads that were destroyed, was wide
open to destructive competition and wasteful practices.3 It was highly
competitive within itself, and highly competitive with other means of
transportation, far transcending what had once been thought possible.4
Nowhere was cutthroat competition so dangerous as in transportation'
and the threat from unbridled and irresponsible competition might
be more serious than the danger of monopolistic control. 6
The proposed new regulation was not unopposed.7 The Post Office
Department said that monopolies would most likely result from the
requirement prohibiting flights by independent operators unless they
could obtain a certificate,8 and the Department of Commerce was
"unalterably opposed" to the certificate requirement when the industry
was so young, so devoid of secondary routes, and without "enough com-
petition to promote the potential traffic. "" But Congress passed the Act.
The sponsor of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, said, in urging
the passage of his bill, "The industry has reached the point where
unbridled and unregulated competition is a public menace,",and one
of the two major aims of his bill was protection against cutthroat com-
petition."0 Nine years later, the head of the Air Transport Association
said that the airline situation "approaches, in some respect, what I call
cutthroat competition, which to my mind is not only fantastic but
decidedly uneconomical. I think it goes beyond the purview of the
Act.""
In September 1940, on a route system slightly expanded over that
made permanent by the Act, 41 percent of airline passenger traffic was
competitive. 12 By September 1947, this figure had gone up to 59 per-
cent.13 By 1950, it was 63.5 percent. 14
3 Testimony of Edgar S. Gorrell. To Create a Civil Aeronautics Authority,
p. 309.
4 Testimony of Edgar S. Gorrell. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Interstate Commerce, Regulation of Transportation of Passengers and Property
by Aircraft (Hearings before a subcommittee, 75th Congress, 1st Session. U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 501.
5 Testimony of Edgar S. Gorrell, Ibid., p. 513.
) Testimony of Edgar S. Gorrell, Aviation, p. 67.
7 Ibid. p. 67.
8 Letter from James A. Farley, Postmaster General, to Hon. Burton K.
Wheeler, Chairman, Committee on Interstate Commerce, March 11, 1937. Aviation,
p. 122.
9 Letter from J. M. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, to Hon. Pat
McCarran, Chairman, Committee on Interstate Commerce, December 16, 1936.
Regulation of Transportation of Passengers and Property by Aircraft, p. 89.
10 Remarks of Hon. Clarence F. Lea, Chairman, House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 83 Congressional Record 6407 and 6507, 1938.
11 Statement of Vice Admiral E. S. Land, President, Air Transport Associa-
tion of America. President's Air Policy Commission, Public Testimony, Vol. 1,
p. 60, September 15, 1947.
12 Frederick W. Gill and Gilbert L. Bates, Airline Competition (Boston:
Harvard University Printing Office, 1949), p. 27.
13 Ibid., p. 27.
14 Based upon new route authorizations of the CAB between September 1947
when Gill and Bates computed their figures, and March 1950 when such certifica-
tions practically ceased.
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Many people familiar with the industry agree that there is too much
airline competition. The President's Air Policy Commission attributed
the 1947-1948 difficulties of the industry primarily to over-expansion
based on mistaken assumptions as to postwar traffic.' 5 The authors of
part of the Hoover Commission study on transportation stated that
there has been unplanned competitive development with over-expansion
and general financial instability, caused by a gross miscalculation of
the air transportation market. 16 The Secretary of Commerce agreed
that the CAB fostered competition on the basis of optimistic estimates
of the potential market.' 7
Gill and Bates said in 1949 in their book "Airline Competition"
that the most deterimental effect on airlines was competition in their
major markets, and that the competition of more than two carriers was
the major flaw in the expansion of the system.' 8 The Aviation Securi-
ties Committee of the Investment Bankers Association stated that com-
petition was excessive, and that one of the main problems of the in-
dustry was how to reduce it.19 The presidents of the five largest airlines
and one of the smaller ones stated that there was too much route
duplication and competition.20 Others have made qualified criticisms,
saying that there is too much competition in some sections and not
enough in others. These include the Congressional Aviation Policy
Board,21 and four of the medium-sized carriers, with varying degrees
of emphasis. 22
The Civil Aeronautics Board, which granted the competitive routes,
has generally defended its actions. At times it has said "There is no
basis for a conclusion that there is excessive, uneconomic or destructive
competition '23 and "We do not believe . . . that a general reduction
in the present degree of competition would be desirable . . . ",24 In
15 U. S. President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age (Wash-
ington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 100.
16 Charles L. Dearing and Wilfred Owen, National Transportation Policy
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1949), p. 369.
17 U. S. Department of Commerce, Issues Involved in a Unified and Coordi-
nated Federal Program for Transportation, A Report to the President from the
Secretary of Commerce (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949),
p. 16.
'8 Gill and Bates, op. cit., pp. 506, 628, 631.
19 Investment Bankers Association of America, Aviation Securities Commit-
tee, "Report on Air Transportation," THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE,
16:223, Spring, 1949.
20 U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Air-Line Industry Investigation (Hearings, 81st Congress, 1st Session. Wash-
ington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949-1950). American at pp. 742, 744,
745; United at p. 671; TWA at pp. 1775, 1776; Northwest at p. 565; Continental
at p. 1614. Eastern in Statement Submitted to the President's Air Policy Com-
mission, p. 11.
21 U. S. Congress, Congressional Aviation Policy Board, National Aviation
Policy (80th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1948), p. 26.22 Air-Line Industry Investigation. Capital at p. 693; Delta at p. 1076;
Braniff at pp. 1359-1360; National at p. 2112.
23 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Statement Before the President's Air Policy
Commission, October 27, 1947, p. 240.
24 Air-Line Industry Investigation, pp. 554-555.
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other places the CAB has admitted that competition may have been
carried too far in certain instances.25 The CAB has also pointed out
that the airline industry itself pressed hard for expansion. In 1943,
there were almost 350 applications for more than 500,000 miles of
routes to over 3,600 cities; granting them all would have expanded the
airline system ten times its existing size to a route mileage more than
all railroad and common-carrier bus routes combined. 6
And the CAB has had support from various sources. One transpor-
tation authority said in 1945 that the industry would be better off with
double its existing number of major firms. 27 The president of one of
the smaller airlines pointed out that between 1941 and 1947, route
mileage increased less than three-fold while traffic increased almost
five-fold, and that an 80-percent rise in route density could not be called
over-expansion. 2s An economist also disputed the conclusions of Gill
and Bates, stating that the major trouble of the airlines was not com-
petition, but the size and density of the carriers' routes.29
It is to be expected, of course, that most of the airlines speak with
something less than complete objectivity. The larger carriers are well
established, and would generally like to reduce competition or at least
to maintain their present dominant position. The medium-sized and
smaller carriers are against more competition when it means another
airline coming into their territory; they are for competition when they
either have recently been expanded into another's area or see the pos-
sibility of such expansion. The noncertificated carriers, since they are
not in the semi-protected position of the certificate holders, criticize
the envied "monopolies."
Practically all arguments have been advanced by all contenders.
Whoever takes any position at all must of necessity agree with some
arguments of one of the major groups. Any objective analysis will
therefore sound in part like the echoes of some special-interest plead-
ing. In fact, it is extremely difficult to find an objective analyst, even
if he has no financial stake in the industry. For one thing, many con-
clusions are based on the social and political orientation of the person
making the analysis. For another, by the time he has acquired sufficient
detailed knowledge of economic theory or the air transportation facts
of life, he has usually alsoacquired a set of opinions that may seem to
others to be only personal prejudices.
25 Ibid., pp. 13, 56. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Transportation Study (Hearings, 81st Congress, 2nd Session.
Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 18.
26 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Annual Report, 1943 (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office), p. 10.
27 Kent T. Healy, "Workable Competition in Air Transportation," American
Economic Review, 35:239, May, 1945.
28 Carleton Putnam (President of Chicago & Southern Air Lines), "Air Line
Outlook," Air Affairs 2:499, Winter, 1949.
29 Harold D. Koontz, "Economic and Managerial Factors Underlying Sub-
sidy Needs of Domestic Trunk Line Air Carriers," THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND
COMMERCE, 18:121, Spring, 1951.
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WHAT ARE THE COSTS OF AIRLINE COMPETITION?
How much does airline competition cost? In all the arguments
about competition and monopoly in the airlines, no one has yet pro-
duced the answer to this question.
There are several kinds of cost which might be caused by competi-
tion. One is the cost of excess transportation capacity flown, which is
the cost for which a dollar estimate is made in this chapter. Another
is the cost of excess capital and labor which a competitive industry
entails. Another is the cost of unnecessary promotional expense to the
extent that it is devoted to attempted diversion of traffic from other air
carriers. Another is the social cost produced by the other costs-the
other costs have made the price of the service higher than it would
otherwise have been, which thereby restricts the size of the market,
and therefore deprives a large proportion of society from benefiting
by the efforts of the industry and the subsidy paid by the entire society
via government taxes. To the extent that only the first of these costs
is measured, the figures in this paper are only partial and therefore
understate the true aggregate cost of airline competition.
Excess Capacity Flown
To estimate the excess capacity caused by parallel competition, two
effects were analyzed. One was the effect of splitting route densities. It
is common experience that dense traffic routes have higher load factors
than light traffic routes. If a route is operated by more than one carrier,
the traffic of the route is split and each carrier operates a route of only
a fraction of the traffic density he would have had with a monopoly of
all the traffic. Because of this fact alone, each competitor would there-
fore run at lower load factors than would a monopolist.
The other effect is competitive overscheduling. There is a tendency
for airlines to schedule more capacity on their competitive routes than
on their noncompetitive routes of similar traffic density.
In order to test the validity of these hypotheses, it was necessary to
develop statistical measures. The data readily available for analysis of
revenue passenger load factors was quite limited. It consisted of the
CAB's published Station-to-Station Airline Traffic Surveys, which for
the postwar period began with September 1946 and covered March and
September of each year through 1949, after which they were abolished.
The survey of September 1948 was selected for this analysis.30 The
revenue passenger load factor for the domestic trunklines in that month
was 59.9 percent. This is relatively low for the usually near-peak month
of September, but not too far below the six-year average for 1947-1952
of 64.3 percent.3 '
30 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Airline Traffic Survey, September 1948
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office).
31 The revenue passenger load factors for the domestic trunk air-lines for
1947 through 1952 were 65.7, 58.3, 59.0, 62.7, 69.6, and 65.6 percent respectively
(U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Recurrent Report of Mileage and Traffic Data).
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The Survey shows as a separate segment every portion of a route
between every successive point listed in the route certificates, or 711
segments. Consolidation of route segments was desirable. Minor inter-
mediate points should not define a route segment for the purpose of this
analysis; distinction should be made only where a segment has some real
operational meaning, such as where schedules originate or terminate
or split into alternative branches. It is also desirable to reduce the
number of segments to minimize the duplicated reporting of the same
traffic, since the station-to-station type of flow data repeats the same
traffic on each segment over which it flows.
It was therefore decided to consolidate all geographically contiguous
route segments where the seating capacity varied by less than 5 per-
cent. 2 The number of segments was reduced by this process from the
711 originally reported to 291 .33
In this analysis, it was decided to use medians rather than means.
The median, which is the central item in any group arrayed in order
of size, gives equal importance to every item in the group; the mean,
which is the arithmetic average of all items, shows a greater effect due
to extreme items. Because means would give even more effect to the
extreme values of duplicated traffic, they were rejected in favor of
medians.
Effect of Splitting Route Densities
The 291 segments were arrayed in rank order of daily revenue
passengers. These were then divided into 29 groups of 10 items each,
and the median found for each group. A freehand curve was next drawn
through these 29 medians. The values of average load factor, corre-
sponding to each hundred passengers of daily route traffic density, were
then read off this smoothed trend curve. These are shown in Table 1.
What does this mean in the way of average load factors where two
or more competitors evenly split the traffic of any route of a particular
density? For example, if any route with a density of 100 passengers per
day were operated by any carrier, its load factor, would typically be
55.9 percent. If two parallel routes, each of 100 passengers density, were
operated by two carriers, each would theoretically have this same load
factor. However, if a carrier operated a single route with a density of
200 passengers per day, the load factor would typically be 58.8 percent.
Now suppose that, replacing two competitive parallel routes of 100
passengers each, a single combined route of 200 passengers were op-
erated by only one carrier. The load factor would typically go up from
55.9 to 58.8, a gain of 2.9 points, or a gain of 5.2 percent when com-
puted on the base of the original 55.9 points.
As another example, three parallel routes of 800 passengers density
82 Where the final segments combined more than one of the original segments,
the daily revenue passengers and available seating capacity were obtained by
averaging the first and last of the component segments.
83 This detailed tabulation is too bulky for reproduction here. For those
interested in examining it, a very limited number of typewritten copies is in the
possession of the author.
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would each typically have a load factor of 65.9. A single route of 2400
passengers density would normally have a load factor of 74.4. If three
separate carriers each operating 100-passenger routes were combined
into a single carrier operation, the same traffic could be expected to
produce an average load factor of 74.4 instead of 65.9, a gain of 8.5
points or 12.9 percent of the initial 65.9 load factor. The results of these
computations can now be applied to the airline industry. Of the total
291 segments, half the total traffic is carried on the top-ranking 45
segments with a median density of 850 passengers a day and an average
of three competitors. For this half the total traffic, the penalty of com-
petition is 12.9 percent.
An additional 42 percent of the total traffic is carried on the next-
ranking 174 segments with a median density of 150 passengers a day
and an average of two competitors. Their penalty of competition is
5.5 percent.
TABLE 1
AVERAGE PASSENGER LOAD FACTOR FOR PASSENGER DENSITY
INTERVALS, BASED ON FREEHAND CURVE OF MEDIAN
VALUES OF 10-SEGMENT GROUPS, SEPTEMBER 1948
Revenue Revenue
passengers passenger
per day load factor
100 55.9
200 58.8






















*This was the last value on the curve. From 1,600 through 2,500, a straight-
line increase was assumed. A maximum terminal value of 75.0 at 2,500 was also
assumed, with all densities above that value assumed to be stable at 75.0.
The remaining 8 percent of the total traffic is carried on the lowest
72 segments with a median density of 65 passengers a day and no com-
petition. This group therefore suffers no penalty from competition.
When these three groups are combined and given their appropriate
relative weighting, a figure is produced for the domestic trunk airline
system as a whole. The presence of competition, on the basis of splitting
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route densities only, is estimated to cost the airlines an average of 8.8
percent .in load factor.
A number of objections can be made to this method. For one thing,
it is entirely a statistical approach. Obviously, individual load factors
differ considerably from the "typical" values. There are many variables,
aside from the number of operators of a route, which affect the load
factors, and this particular statistical approach neglects them all. It
treats all segments as though their lengths were the same, which of
course neglects the relative passenger-mile weighting of the segments.
It assumes that competitors split traffic evenly, which of course they
do not because of varying degrees of competitive effectiveness.
These objections are of some validity. If the purpose of this analysis
were to produce a precise figure, the evaluation and refinement of each
of these factors would be necessary, and would require a vast amount
of statistical work. But in order to get a first approximation to the cost
of competition, such refinement is not necessary.
There is one factor which Would tend to lower this estimated cost.
That is the fact that, as schedules are added, some traffic is attracted
merely by the fact that there is a higher frequency of service. This
effect decreases as the number of frequencies is increased since there is
a decline in the relative gain in passenger convenience. And since most
of the competitive traffic is on the heavier routes with high schedule
frequency, this factor is not as important as it would be on the lighter
routes. In addition, some of the schedules added competitively are at
about the same hours of the day, and therefore contribute little to
added passenger convenience other than gross capacity at peak hours.
There is also one factor which, as an offset to the above, would tend
to increase the estimated cost. In deriving the curve of load factor
related to traffic density, it is obvious that the higher end of the curve
is made up of segments that are exclusively competitive, and the lower
end is based primarily on noncompetitive segments. To the extent that
competitive routes operate at lower load factors, and noncompetitive
routes operate at higher load factors, then, the curve as presented here
does not have as steep a slope as it should, since its upper end is unduly
depressed and its lower end is unduly raised. If a correction could be
made for this, the effect of splitting route densities would be greater.
Effect of Competitive Overscheduling
In attempting to test the hypothesis of competitive overscheduling,
the first problem was one of definition and classification. Some routes
are highly competitive, many are noncompetitive, and most are inter-
mediate between the two extremes. A method of classification was
needed which, though by the underlying nature of its material could
not wholly eliminate the element of personal judgement, could still
set up a reasonably objective grouping.
The highly competitive routes were therefore defined by the fol-
lowing statistical process. The hundred pairs of cities ranking highest
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in September 1948 traffic volume were selected. Their distribution by
carrier is shown in the Survey, and traffic was considered competitive
when at least one other airline carried ten percent or more of the traffic
of the dominant airline 4 Where there were possible alternative rout-
ings within the routes of a single carrier, a distribution among them
was made on the basis of number of through flights via each routing.
In this way, the competitive traffic of these hundred city combinations
was credited to each carrier route segment. Wherever this traffic was
more than half the total flow of passengers, the segment was considered
to be highly competitive.
This definition obviously excludes many other segments which are
highly competitive but which do not meet this particular statistical
test. Since the base includes only the hundred top-ranking pairs of
cities with 44.4 percent of the total passengers in the .Survey month, it
leaves out all the remainder of the 16,682 combinations of cities hav-
ing 55.6 percent of the traffic. This has two effects: the degree of com-
petition on the heavier route segments is understated, and many of the
lighter route segments are omitted even though their degree of com-
petition may be just as high. As a statistical sample for comparative
purposes, however, it is composed solely of highly competitive seg-
ments, even though it does not contain all of them.
The definitely noncompetitive route segments were selected from
the airline system map for September 1948, by visual inspection for
cases where there could obviously be neither long-haul nor short-haul
competition. Here, too, the selection excluded a number of segments
which, though more or less paralleled by other route lines on the map,
are essentially noncompetitive on a traffic basis.
On the basis of these particular definitions, the 291 route segments
were grouped into the three classes of highly competitive, definitely
noncompetitive, and other segments. They were next subdivided into
groups by traffic density, and the median load factor was then found
for each group. The results are shown in Table 2.
The conclusions from this table are clear. In every density group
except the lowest, the load factors of definitely noncompetitive segments
are higher than the "other" group.35 The differences, as a percent of
the "other" group load factor, are as follows:
0- 25 passengers minus 10.2 percent
25- 50 " plus 7.4
50- 75 " 10.8
75 - 100 " ." 10.3
100-150 " " 8.2
150 - 200 .. . 18.4
200-700 " " 3.5
The over-all median difference is 8.2 percent.
34 The reasons for using this criterion are explained in Frederick W. Gill
and Gilbert L. Bates, op. cit., p. 23.
35 The probable reason for the lowest density group showing a different result
from all other groups in the two brief tabulations below is fairly clear. Where
traffic is low, carriers normally provide minimum service in terms of trip fre-
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TABLE 2
PASSENGER LOAD FACTOR OF DOMESTIC TRUNKLINES
FOR DEFINITELY NONCOMPETITIVE, HIGHLY COMPETITIVE, AND
OTHER ROUTE SEGMENTS, GROUPED BY PASSENGERS
PER DAY, SEPTEMBER 1948
Definitely Highly
Noncompetitive "Other" Competitive
Passengers Num- Pas- Load Num- Pas- Load Num- Pas- Load
Per Day ber seng'rs fact'r ber seng'rs fact'r ber seng'rs fact'r
0 - 24.9 15 13.9 34.3 10 15.4 38.2 1 22.6 45.6
25 - 49.9 15 38.0 53.7 17 42.0 50.0 - - -
50 - 74.9 10 63.8 59.4 22 61.4 53.6 - - -
75 - 99.9 7 89.4 52.5 10 85.9 47.6 1 75.4 39.5
100 - 149.9 12 119.8 61.0 20 131.0 56.4 5 116.5 55.1
150 - 199.9 6 171.6 66.8 18 172.7 56.4 - - -
200 - 699.9 8 376.2 65.2 75 352.4 63.0 11 390.2 59.9
700 and over - - - 18 882.3 67.4 10 1148.3 67.4
Total 73 190 28
Because of the much smaller sample for comparison, similar per-
centage differences between the definitely noncompetitive and the
highly competitive route segments are somewhat less reliable. They are:
0 - 25 passengers minus 24.7 percent
75 - 100 " plus 32.9
100 - 150 ". . 10.7
200-700 ". . 8.8
The median of these differences is about 9.7 percent.
Unfortunately for this test, there are no definitely noncompetitive
route segments with traffic densities above 700 passengers per day. Be-
tween the highly competitive and "other" segments the median load
factors are the same. But since the median density of the highly com-
petitive segments is almost 1150 compared to 880 for the "other" seg-
ments, it would seem to be true that the highly competitive segments
tend to have lower load factors for comparable densities.
On the basis of the above analysis, it is probable that the presence
of competition in the domestic trunk airline system costs something
over 9 percent in load factors due solely to competitive overscheduling.
Translation of Load Factors Into Cost
The total effect of competitive overscheduling is about a 9 percent
loss in load factor and the effect of splitting route densities is another
9 percent loss in load factor. The total is 18 percent.
This does not mean 18 percentage points loss in load factor, but
a loss of 18 percent of the load factor percentage. In other words, if
the experienced load factor of the airline network were 50 percent, a
system which was comparable in every way except for being wholly non-
competitive would have a load factor of 59.0 percent; if the competitive
quency, such as two round trips per day. Capacity on these routes therefore has
little relationship to traffic volume, as long as such volume remains low. Load
factors on these route segments consequently show little if any correlation with
volume of traffic carried.
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system had a 60-percent load factor, a comparable noncompetitive sys-
tem would have a load factor of 70.8 percent.
Suppose now that there were two hypothetical airline systems, each
with identical traffic and other characteristics, but one with the com-
petition of the existing domestic trunk airlines and the other with no
competition. The competitive one would have a particular load factor;
the noncompetitive one would have a load factor 18 percent higher.
Since both would have the same traffic, and since the load factor is
equal to the traffic divided by the available capacity, the capacity of
the noncompetitive system would be lower by the reciprocal of 1.18,
or 15.3 percent. All expenses that vary with capacity would be less by
15.3 percent; all expenses that vary with traffic volume would be the
same.
Segregation of these two types of expense is difficult when using
the standard accounts of the air carriers. However, in the "Big Four"
investigation, the CAB staff made a useful functional distribution.




Operating costs .................... 468,248
Ground operations ................. 78,603
Traffic ............................. 58,925




integration costs .................. 2,990
Total ............................ 865,528
The first two items vary directly with capacity provided. The next
three vary with traffic handled. Of the total of these five items, the
capacity variables account for 69.9 percent of the total, and the traffic
variables account for 30.1 percent. Since the general expenses of the
last two items are usually allocated in proportion to the other groups,
the total expenses of these four airlines can therefore be divided about
70 -30 between capacity and traffic costs. Smaller airlines usually show
some differences from Big Four experience, but the average industry
distribution is probably reflected very closely in this computation.
Now, return to the hypothetical noncompetitive airline system. The
70 percent of costs that vary with capacity would be reduced 15.3
percent below the existing competitive system. The 30 percent of costs
that vary with traffic would not be reduced at all. The total cost of
the noncompetitive system would therefore be 10.7 percent below that
s6Direct Exhibits of Public Counsel, Big Four Mail Rate and Efficiency
Investigation (Dockets Nos. 2849 and 3663), Washington, October 13, 1950. Ex-
hibits PC 350, pp. 4 and 5, PC 351, pp. 4 and 5, and PC 352, pp. 4 and 5, "Financial
Results, before Cost and Fare Level and Volume Adjustments, Allocated Among
Types of Services," Calendar Years 1949, 1948, and 1947.
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of the existing competitive system. For the domestic trunk airlines in
1953, with a total operating expense of about $783,000,0003 7 the cost
of competition due solely to load factor losses is therefore -estimated at
almost $84,000,000.
Of course, the percentage would vary somewhat from year to year,
depending among other things upon the relative size of the experienced
load factors. At low load factors, the improvement possible through
the elimination of competition is fairly high; at high load factors, the
possible range between existing load factors and the highest attainable
is narrowed. This 10.7 percent figure should therefore vary somewhat
in its application to any particular year.
WHAT ADVANTAGES ARE CLAIMED FOR AIRLINE COMPETITION?
Does Competition Increase Traffic?
One of the major advantages claimed for airline competition is that
it increases airline traffic. The industry and the CAB have generally
believed this claim. Applicants have presented evidence of it in num-
erous cases before the CAB. A former chairman of the CAB, testifying
before a Senate committee, summed it up clearly:
I have listened to argument again and again . . . where there
is competition the traffic potential has been developed, where there
is no competition the drive to develop the traffic potential is missing.
That is pretty impressive evidence that has accumulated over the
years.38
The CAB also summed it up statistically for the President's Air
Policy Commission: on segments where competition was not increased,
the average growth in passengers was 3.37 times from September 1940
to September 1946; on segments where competition was first established
or increased, the growth was 4.38 times, or about 30 percent higher.8 9
Unfortunately, these conclusions are wrong. In the route cases, the
applicants for the new competitive routes presented selected illustra-
tions or compilations aimed at proving their contentions. A wide range
of growth rates has been experienced in both competitive and non-
competitive routes, due to causes largely unrelated to competition, and
a selective sampling can be used to support almost any desired position.
In the statistical conclusion, the CAB made the honest but unfor-
tunate error of disregarding at least two important facts. One fact was
that the figures lumped together the true "monopoly" routes -where
a single carrier retained exclusive rights to a route - with competitive
routes where the competition was not increased. The other fact is that
87 Estimate made by L. C. Sorrell, economic director of the Air Transport
Association. AVIATION WEEK, December 28, 1953, p. 54.
38 Statement of James M. Landis, U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, Air-Line Industry Investigation, pp. 306-307.
39 Statement of Civil Aeronautics Board before the President's Air Policy
Commission, October: 27, 1947, p. 33.
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September 1946 was selected for a comparison; 1946 was a year of post-
war demand far outstripping postwar supply in air travel; competitive
routes add more capacity than noncompetitive routes; competitive
routes were therefore higher simply because there was more space on
them to accommodate the huge traffic bulge of that period.
The CAB has published a series of origination-destination Airline
Traffic Surveys showing, for March and September of each peacetime
year, a complete count of all tickets sold and the routings taken be-
tween all airline points. The earliest of these complete surveys is for
September 1940, relatively close to the basic "grandfather" route struc-
ture. The latest useful one for this test is September 1948, comparable
seasonally to the 1940 survey, but before the introduction of low sky-
coach fares increased particular traffic movements so greatly as to con-
ceal the effects of competition.
The heavy traffic combinations are the ones for which competitive
route authorizations are primarily designed. The smaller station com-
binations generally receive competitive service only incidentally. A
valid statistical test can therefore be based on the highest-ranking sta-
tion combinations.
The station combinations chosen were the one hundred ranking
highest in either passengers or passenger-miles in the continental U. S.
in September 1948, with one-carrier service in 1940. These 119 top-
ranking pairs of stations accounted for slightly over 44 percent of total
continental U. S. passenger travel in September 1948.
A competitive service was defined as one where any carrier received
ten percent or more of the traffic of the dominant carrier. City com-
binations were grouped by length of haul, since detailed analysis shows
a marked effect of this factor on rate of traffic growth. They were also
grouped by number of carriers serving them during the two survey
months.
The statistical results can only be considered as approximate. They
neglect all variables other than distance and competition, many of
which. have a marked effect on traffic growth. However, they produce
a reasonable degree of accuracy.
A summary of the results, showing the times increase in number of
passengers between September 1940 and September 1948, and using
the arithmetic averages of all city combinations, is as follows:
Distance intervals in miles Number
0- 500- 1000 of
499 999 & over Total cases
No increase in competition:
1 carrier ................. 4.05 5.35 6.57 4.41 41
2 carriers ................ 2.34 4.23 4.38 2.46 13
3 carriers ................ - 3.17 5.10 3.63 6
4 carriers .............. - - 9.66 9.66 1
Total .................. 3.26 3.72 5.77 3.59 61
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Increase in competition:
From 2 to.3 carriers ....... 3.02 3.80 5.22 3.77 4
From 1 to 2 carriers ....... 3.45 4.23 7.54 3.96 46
From 1 to 3 carriers ....... 3.86 5.15 5.09 3.89 7
From 1 to 4 carriers ....... - 4.12 - 4.12 1
Total .................. 3.64 4.21 6.76 3.93 58
At first glance this table would seem to prove the CAB's conclusions
correct; the increased-competition group had higher growth rates in
all distance intervals. But on more detailed examination it becomes
obvious that the true "monopoly" routes showed the greatest increase
of all. In total, this group grew 10 percent more than the best of the
competition-added group. It ranked highest under 500 miles and high-
est between 500 and 1000 miles. It ranked second at distances over
1000 miles, but the average distance for this group was only 1415 miles
compared to the average of 1729 for the highest-ranking group.
As far as concerns differences between groups where no competition
was added, there may be room for some argument as to the reason. On
the one hand it may be, as the pro-competition viewpoint would have
it, that in the early period there were already two or three competitors
who had developed traffic to a greater extent than had the single-carrier
route; it was therefore more difficult to achieve a greater percentage
increase. Or it might be true, as the anti-competition viewpoint would
have it, that over a long period of time a single carrier can develop
traffic more fully; he can spread his schedules in proportion to the
demand at all hours, rather than bunch them competitively only at the
most popular hours and thereby neglect the less profitable but still
lucrative secondary hours.
But this latter argument is valid only for the case of a single carrier
remaining in sole possession of a route, and not for the case where
there is an increase from an initial multiple-carrier to an increased
multiple-carrier operation. This is also shown by the traffic increase
of the continuing one-carrier service as compared to the continuing
two-carrier and three-carrier services.
It is also to be expected that the very method of granting com-
petitive routes would give the competition-added group a more rapid
expansion. The CAB undoubtedly granted more competition where
it thought more traffic would develop, and denied it where it thought
the traffic potentials were less favorable. If the CAB's judgment was at
all better than mere chance, the competition-added groups should
have done better than the continued single-carrier group. The fact
that this did not result makes more convincing the conclusion that
competitive routes develop no more traffic than do noncompetitive
routes.
Whitehead 40 has made a detailed study, also for the months of
40 Herbert H. Whitehead, "Effects of Competition and Changes in Route
Structure on Growth of Domestic Air Travel," THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND
COMMERCE, 18:78-90, Winter, 1951.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
September 1940 and September 1948, of all traffic to and from the ten
largest traffic centers of the country. His sample accounted for over 35
percent of the nation's domestic passenger traffic. He made a statistical
analysis of the effect of competition and other factors affecting the rate
of growth for specific city combinations: initially low traffic volume,
early stage of route development, mileage reductions and correspond-
ing fare cuts in new routings, length of travel, improvements in air-
port convenience, the addition of new stations diverting travel from
older nearby stations, the domestic portions of international traffic,
and new gateways for international traffic. One of his major conclu-
sions was "Claims for greatly stimulated air travel resulting from
competition have not been borne out." 41
Gill and Bates42 also made a brief study of this claim. They analyzed
the 106 top-ranking city combinations, for the months of September
1940 and September 1947, by distance intervals. Their statistics show
that, on an arithmetic average basis, the combinations where compe-
tition was added showed passenger increases of 315 percent compared
to 278 percent for the same-competition combinations. On a median
basis, the latter group showed a 366-percent increase compared to only
337 percent for the former. Their conclusions were that the addition
of competition had little to do with traffic growth.
These figures are not absolutely conclusive. Any such statistical
compilation leaves many variations unexplained because it does not
take into account all variables. But the statistics do seem to indicate
that the claim that airline competition generates additional traffic is
of extremely dubious validity.
Does Competition Decrease Fares?
Everyone agrees that the long-term trend of air fares should be
downward. The public interest is best served by the lowest possible
fares, producing the greatest volume of air transportation, and yet
allowing the carriers a reasonable rate of return. One of the virtues
claimed for competition is that it decreases fares.
Even though prices are usually identical via each competitive air-
line between the same points, it has often been said that competition
has been a major influence in reducing the general fare level, that it
assures potential economies being passed on to the public in the form
of lower fares rather than being kept as higher profits, and that even
with equal fares there is competition in service.
Gill and Bates said that "airline competition has been and con-
tinues to be a major influence in preserving a low level of air fares
in the domestic United States," although they pointed out that this is
true only of the first competitor added and not of the second and third
and fourth competitors. 48 They gave as an illustration of the opposite
effect Eastern's ability to charge higher fares than the other three of
4' Ibid., p. 88.
42 Gill and Bates, op. cit., p. 33.
4S Ibid., p. 475.
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the Big Four carriers because of its relative lack. of effective compe-
tition.44
Competitive reduction in fares was, of course, one of the major
reasons for the Civil Aeronautics Act. In 1937, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission said that there had recently been a sharp reduction
in passenger fares by at least five scheduled airlines in a competitive
race for traffic, and that this situation might endanger the stability
of the industry unless government regulation was adopted.
45
Drastic competitive 'reductions in air passenger fares were also
made after the fall of 1929. Fares were cut to approximately Pullman
levels by airlines directly competitive with railroad passenger services;
airlines not directly competing with the rails also cut their rates in
many cases, but not to as great an extent.46
Since then, airlines have used a variety of special fares competi-
tively: the Universal Air Travel Card plan, round-trip discounts, the
family fare plan, seasonal fares, coach fares, and other promotional
devices. The airlines were seeking to expand their market. They knew,
of course, that the other airlines would meet their fare cuts as usual.
The expansion of their market came, not at the expense of other air-
lines, but at the expense of railroad and other surface travel. Competi-
tion with other transportation was the major justification for airline
fare reductions, rather than competition with the parallel routes of
other airlines.
There is a close relationship between price and cost in all indus-
tries - price equals cost plus profit. In the airlines, there is the addi-
tional element of subsidy - price equals cost plus profit less subsidy.
In any public utility, the regulatory agency in the long run sets the
upper limit to the profit margin, usually as a rate of return on invest-
ment. Therefore, in air transportation, the government determines
two of the factors, -profit and subsidy. As a rule, then, the carriers do
not control their general fare levels. The CAB does. For airlines, price
equals cost plus two elements fixed by the CAB.
Aside from CAB policy, then, what sets the airline fare level is
their cost level. Airline competition is not a cheap commodity. It is
estimated that the cost due solely to lower revenue passenger load fac-
tors is about 10.7 percent of total airline expenses. In 1953 this amount
was almost $84,000,000. In the eleven years from 1938 through 1952,
excluding the years 1942-1945 during the war when load factors were
at a maximum regardless of competition, this extra cost of competition
came to almost $37 2,000,000.4 7 This may be compared with total air
mail payments to the carriers by the government during the entire 15
years (including the four war years) of $447,000,000, which included
44 Ibid., p. 537.
45 Letter from Interstate Commerce Commission to Hon. Clarence F. Lea,
Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, March 29, 1937.
U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Aviation,
P.18.p. 46G. Lloyd Wilson, Air Transportation and Regulation (Chicago: The
Traffic Service Corporation, 1940), p. 25.
47 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Recurrent Report of Financial Data.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
not only the subsidy element but the service element for the cost of
carrying the mail.
The effect of competition on the fare level, therefore, cannot be
measured solely by the immediate effects of fare reductions on par-
ticular routes. Through its effect on costs, it has a far greater influence
in keeping fares up, not in reducing them.
The judging of fare levels and profit margins and subsidy payments
is not, of course, a very scientific process. All are considered together,
largely without even analyzing their interrelitionship, and the whole
financial result of the regulatory and managerial process comes out
as a single "package." Many factors vary to make estimates of future
trends inaccurate, and individual CAB members and individual air-
line executives differ widely in their judgments of what these various
levels should be.
In a number of particular instances, competition has a tendency to
press for lower fares. In the downward direction, if one carrier intro-
duces reduced-fare programs such as family fare or coach fares, his
major competitors are forced to follow quickly or lose practically all
of their traffic. And acting as a brake in the upward direction, if one
carrier wants to raise his fares and his competitors will not do so, he
must leave his fares at the lower level or lose most of his business. In
individual cases, then, competition helps reduce fares when there is
unilateral action downward, and helps keep them down where there is
a unilateral decision to raise them.
But suppose that competition had never been created in the airline
network, and suppose that the costs of competition had never been
incurred. Suppose further, in order to keep other variables out of
this line of reasoning, that the CAB had not tried to apply the savings
to other objectives such as reducing the subsidy cost to the taxpayers
or extending uneconomic services to a greater number of lean routes
and small cities. And suppose, if the airlines had not done so on their
own initiative, that the CAB had exercised its power under the Civil
Aeronautics Act to reduce fares in line with the resultant lower costs.
Would not the air fares of this hypothetical airline system have been
lower, based as they would be upon a whole cost level that was lower,
than those of the actual system of route competition with its pressures
for lower fares aided by individual situations but resting upon a higher
floor of costs?
Does Competition Increase Quality of Service?48
Another advantage generally claimed for airline competition is
that it is a powerful force to improve the quality of service. This
improvement is of particular value in public utilities where the regu-
latory process is said to be typically unsuited to encouraging positive
48 This subject has been treated in exhaustive case-by-case detail in Gill and
Bates, op. cit. The 200-page sections (pp. 195-394) dealing with it are un-
approached in thoroughness by any other source, and they have therefore been
liberally used in preparing this section.
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advances. Competition in quality has been likened to competition in
rates: instead of the public getting the same service at a lower price,
they get more service at the same price.
Before going into the details of this claim, it should be recognized
that better service is not a free gift. Rarely in this world does anyone
get something for nothing, and air transportation is no exception.
Better service requires additional costs.
Gill and Bates listed seven major measures of schedule quality:
frequency, equipment type, arrival and departure times, elapsed time,
number of stops, turnaround versus beyond-terminal service, and con-
necting versus one-plane service to terminal. 49 They are the basic
product offered to the public.
Gill and Bates defined, as significant improvement in schedule
quality, an improvement in at least one (and usually in more than
one) of the seven measures. They then found that, of the 87 city pairs
served competitively in the postwar period, only 33 showed significant
improvement.50 In many cases of non-improvement, the cause was
route franchise restrictions which reduced the effect of competition.51
In addition, they found that of the twenty markets where competition
was by three or more competitors, significant improvement due to the
third or fourth competitor was produced in only one instance.
52
They found that one of the major determinants of schedule quality
is flight equipment, since it determines elapsed time, capacity for
passenger comfort, and the possibility of nonstop flights. 53 As will
be shown next, airline competition has little influence in developing
new aircraft types, although once a new type has been-developed com-
petition hastens its spread to other carriers.
The only measure of schedule quality that Gill and Bates found
was significantly improved in practically all cases was the volume of
available capacity at peak periods. 54 But this product of competition
was largely unused, and this excess capacity is expensive.
It is unfortunate that there has not been a thorough analysis of
improvement in schedule quality between noncompetitive city com-
binations, comparable to that made by Gill and Bates between competi-
tive city pairs. Such an analysis would provide a needed "control"
g roup or yardstick. Gill and Bates found significant improvement in
33 of their 87 competitive city combinations, or 38 percent. There
were probably also significant improvements in schedule quality be-
tween noncompetitive city combinations. It would be very interesting
to compare those results against the 38-percent improvement figure.
Aside from schedule quality, there are a number of other improve-
ments in overall quality of service. They include such ground services
49 Ibid., p. 95.
50 Ibid., p. 95.
51 Ibid., p. 117.
52 Ibid., p. 110.
53 Ibid., p. 59.
54 Ibid., p. 628.
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as reservations, ticketing, and handling of passengers and baggage at
terminals; they also include in-flight services such as meals, lounges,
compartments and sleeping accommodations, cabin attendants, lighting,
ventilation, etc.
Parallel competition has undoubtedly contributed to the develop-
ment or more rapid introduction of such services, even though air
transportation would also have developed some of them as a competi-
tive device against ground transportation. The degree to which they
would have occurred without parallel airline competition is not known.
In any event, the CAB has the power to correct inadequate service.
Section 404 of the Act states that it shall be the duty of every air carrier
to provide adequate service, equipment, and facilities. Under Section
1002 (a) any person may file a complaint with the CAB with respect
to alleged *violation of any provision of the Act, and the CAB must
investigate the complaint if there appears to be reasonable ground
for it; Section 1002 (b) empowers the CAB to institute such an inves-
tigation on its own initiative. It is true that the direct use of these
powers would be very difficult, since adequacy of service is difficult to
define in formal CAB hearings, even though the CAB has said in sev-
eral cases that Section 404 is effective.55 It might also be objected that
the CAB has never used this power, and that the power would there-
fore be ineffective. Which of these views is correct is something that
has not been tested by experience. But it would seem to be wise to try
to exercise existing powers to correct service inadequacies, and then
see whether or not they were effective, rather than to disregard entirely
the existence of the legislative provisions and to try to achieve similar
results by certifying additional competition at additional cost.
There have been some improvements in quality of service due to
competition. There might have been some of them without competi-
tion. But improvements in service, whether caused by competition or
any other factor, generally increase costs. If they increase revenues
more than proportionately, they are profitable; if they increase rev-
enues less, they are unprofitable.
If service improvements due to competition have increased rev-
enues at all, they must have done so by increasing the fare-paying
traffic. But as previously shown, there was no greater growth of traffic
in competitive markets than in noncompetitive markets. This must
be somewhat qualified by the knowledge that improvements developed
on purely competitive routes normally spread to the noncompetitive
routes of the same and other carriers. But the simple fact remains that
competition's claimed improved quality of service is not discernible
in the statistical measurement of traffic volume increases.
55 4 CAB 215, Continental Air Lines, Inc. et at., Additional Air Service in
Texas, decided May 10, 1943, p. 239.
8 CAB 152, Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., et al., Cincinnati-New
York Additional Service, decided June 10, 1947, p. 158.
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Does Competition Develop Aircraft More Rapidly?
Another advantage claimed for airline competition, directly de-
pendent upon the claim of greater incentives, is that it.produces rapid
improvement in aircraft and engines. This claim is generally believed
to be true. Haven't the U. S. competitive airlines always led the world
in technical advances? Aren't most of the world's airways flown with
American-built planes?
And yet something seems recently to have gone awry with' U. S.
leadership. "We are losing the world leadership in transport types of
aircraft," said the head of the CAA.56 This country is at least several
years behind the British in developing jet transport aircraft.
Why was there this great change in the effectiveness of competitive
airlines to produce rapid improvement in aircraft and engines? Or is
it really true that competition did not have as much to do with it,
even in the past, as was claimed?
Before the war, all airlines were on a subsidy basis. They normally
suffered operating deficits in their commercial operations, which were
largely made up by government mail payments. It was to the advan-
tage of each airline to try out new planes. If the experiment was suc-
cessful, the airline had made a forward stride toward economic self-
sufficiency. If it was unsuccessful, the government stood the loss. This
remained true after the war to the extent that mail payment rates still
contained a subsidy element.
Technical difficulties in two new postwar types of planes - the
four-engined DC-6 and Constellation - grounded them for a time.
In setting the mail rates of the carriers, the CAB took into account
amortization charges for the losses caused by these groundings in the
amount of $9,262,000, and the costs of $3,635,000 for integrating these
planes into the operations of three companies.57 Another carrier on a
subsidy rate had the misfortune to be the only purchaser of one type
of postwar twin-engined plane; of the twenty aircraft bought, five
crashed within a few years and the fleet was sold; the integration and
grounding costs were $1,876,000, and the integration costs of still an-
other four-engined postwar plane for the same carrier were $1,497,000,
all of which were taken in'to account in the government's mail pay-
ments. 58Even asi'de from the subsidy factor, it is doubtful that airline
competition was the major determinant in developing the newer four-
engined planes. It is true that most pre-war types were first developed
by the manufacturers with the orders of single airlines; these included
the twin-engined Boeing 247-D, Douglas DC-2 and DC-3, and the four-
56 Statement of Delos W. Rentzel, Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Development of Improved-Type Aircraft (Hearings, 81st Congress,
2nd Session. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 9.
57 CAB Order E-5560, Big Four Rate Case, Revised Statement of Tentative
Findings and Conclusions, decided July 31, 1951, p. 6 and Appendix No. 10.
58 CAB Order E-5839, Northwest Airlines, Inc., Domestic Operations (Mail
Rate Case), Statement of Tentative Findings and Conclusions, decided November
2, 1951, pp. 11, 15, and 21.
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engined Boeing Stratoliner. For several years before the war, however,
all major lines and many of the smaller ones were rapidly standardizing
on the DC-3.
When it came to the four-engined planes and their mounting costs,
however, the airlines began to pool their efforts. The Boeing Strato-
liner was backed by only a single carrier, but it turned out to be very
costly for its capacity, and very few were ever manufactured. On the
Constellation, two noncompetitive carriers collaborated.5 9 Five airlines
helped finance the prototype of the DC-4 three of whom were the three
large transcontinental competitors.0°
Military orders have also been an important factor in developing
new flight equipment. Military aviation was a prime influence in pro-
ducing better engines, and also in some of the most advanced types of
planes which were reworked from military transport models to civil
use.61
Of course, airlines continually try to improve their operations, and
the key to improvement is the type of aircraft flown by the company.
Different managements make different estimates of the efficiency and
desirability of new airplane types. Some of the variation in judgment
is because of the differences in route characteristics among the carriers,
and some is due simply to differences in the personal judgments of
the managers making the decisions.
Competition, of course, is a major element in the decisions on new
equipment. Each of the competitors on a route jealously watches the
aircraft programs of the others, and each knows that in the long run
he must match the others in the speed and comfort of service or lose
out in the market. But for the larger carriers this is a complex choice,
since they compete with different carriers over different routes; each
route has somewhat different characteristics; the ultimate choice must
be a compromise between competitive considerations, the economical
operation of most of the routes, and the necessity for standardizing
upon very few types of aircraft to keep costs down.
The choices are limited. In the field of long-range and high-capacity
postwar four-engined planes, there are only three manufacturers -
Douglas with the DC-6, DC-6B, and DC-7; Lockheed with its series of
Constellations, the 049, 649, 749, and 1049; and Boeing with its Strato-
cruiser. In the twin-engine postwar planes, there are only two manu-
59 Testimony of CAB Chairman James M. Landis. U. S. Congress, House,
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Overseas Air Transportation:
by Steamship Operators, by a Consolidated Air Carrier (Hearings, 80th Congress,
1st Session. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 1229.
60 The five airlines were American, United, TWA, Eastern, and Pan Ameri-
can. AMERICAN AVIATION DAILY, Souvenir Issue, June 1, 1952, quoting from the
issues of June 1 and June 15, 1937.
61 Testimony of W. A. Patterson, President, United Air Lines. U. S. Con-
gress, Senate, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Commerce, To Create
the All-American Flag Line, Inc. (Hearings, 79th Congress, 1st Session. Wash-
ington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 75.
Testimony of Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, War
Department. Ibid., p. 261.
COMPETITION AMONG DOMESTIC TRUNK AIRLINES
facturers - Convair with its model 240 and 340; Martin with its model
202 and 404.
It is true that parallel airline competition has increased the speed
with which new aircraft were purchased and placed in service after they
were developed. When one carrier has a new fleet, his competitors are
forced to re-equip regardless of their previous plans and current de-
sires and regardless of the losses they may take in excessive depreciation
on the aircraft to be replaced. However, competition with surface
transportation would also have produced considerable advances, as
would the desire for more economical planes. Just how much is not
known, since the major carriers who purchase the great bulk of new
planes have always been highly competitive in the transcontinental
markets.
It is interesting to note that in the international field, which of
course differs in some important respects from the domestic systems,
there was very great experimentation in types of aircraft by the com-
pany which for the entire prewar period was a monopoly for U. S.
operations - Pan American. This carrier always had in its inventory
by far the greatest variety of makes and models, both landplanes and
seaplanes, and in twin-engined and four-engined configurations. Al-
though part of this is advisable because of its far-flung operations
throughout the world and under widely different physical and traffic
conditions, it is still true that even now it is the only carrier operating
all three manufacturers' postwar four-engined aircraft, as well as hav-
ing foreign jet planes on order. Only one other carrier operates as
many as two of these manufacturers' aircraft; the others fly only one.
When the influence of competition is weighed against other factors -
government mail pay subsidy, the stimulation of military orders, the
cooperative developmental efforts of competing airlines - competition
seems to be less important in developing new aircraft, although it does
hasten their rate of introduction.
Turning from the past to the present and the future, it seems evi-
dent that airline competition will not be of great influence in pro-
ducing new planes. The cost of a single new type of transport plane has
been estimated in the tens of millions of dollars. 62 The airlines under-
take a heavy financial burden in the first few years of breaking in a
new type of plane - training flight crews and operations personnel,
familiarizing the maintenance crews with the planes, eliminating
unforeseen "bugs," and taking the penalties of excessive delays and
out-of-service time.
It is now generally agreed that the development of new aircraft
types is probably beyond the financial ability of the air carriers. The
argument that parallel competition between airlines is an extremely
62 "Upward of 30 or 35 million dollars per type," according to a statement of
Lawrence B. Richardson, President, Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp. Develop-
ment of Civilian Aircraft Adaptable to Auxiliary Military Service, p. 61.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
important factor in the technological development of new planes and
engines, of dubious validity in the past, is even more doubtful now.
Does Competition Provide Yardsticks?
Another advantage claimed for airline competition is that it pro-
vides cost and service experience by which to measure the relative
efficiency of one airline against another. This fact has been stressed
as of great importance among public utilities, and particularly so when
the government pays large amounts of subsidy.
This view has been generally maintained by the CAB in dealing
with certificated air carriers in domestic new route cases. It has been
strongly supported in U. S. international aviation by the CAB and
other government agencies.
In practice, however, it is quite difficult to use competitors' experi-
ence as yardsticks of managerial efficiency. Conditions are never
identical, and frequently are very dissimilar. The competitive routes
of any carrier are usually paralleled by different competitors on various
routes, and each carrier's system is a different mixture of competitive
and noncompetitive traffic combinations. Evaluation of the competitive
routes separately from the noncompetitive routes has never been done,.
and is probably an almost impossible statistical and accounting job.
Cost comparisons are normally made by the CAB in testing the
reasonableness of carrier costs. The CAB has said that extensive staff
study over the years shows that the unit costs of the carriers are related
to the primary operating factors of length of traffic haul and average
distance between stops, density of traffic, and volume of operations.68
Degree of competition is not one of the factors which they have yet
found to be of great importance in making cost comparisons.
As a matter of fact, their use of "yardsticks" requires only the
existence of separate carriers, not the existence of competitive carriers.
What they require are carriers of comparable operating characteristics,
not of comparable competition. This objective would be just as well
served by regional monopolies that were completely noncompetitive;
it would be even better served, since the varying degrees of competition
would not add an additional complication to the attempted compari-
sons.
An important distinction should also be made between competition
and diversification. A multiplicity of enterprises has some social advan-
tages: it provides a field for individual experimentation in business
and management methods, and an opportunity for more people to move
up into the ranks of management. But here again, a number of regional
monopolies would serve just as well as the same number of competitors.
(TO BE CONTINUED)
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